HOT PURSUIT FROM A CONTIGUOUS FISHERIES
ZONE-AN ASSAULT ON THE FREEDOM
OF THE HIGH SEAS

INTRODUCTION

On September 5, 1974, the Japanese vessel Taiyo Maru was
observed fishing at a position approximately 16 miles from the coast
of Maine and 10.5 miles from Monhegan Island.' This location was
within the exclusive fisheries zone of the United States as established by the Bartlett Act 2 and the Contiguous Fisheries Zone
Act.3 The Bartlett Act prohibits foreign vessels from fishing within
the three-mile territorial sea of the United States and provides
sanctions 4 for violations. The Contiguous Fisheries Zone Act
extends that prohibition to a nine-mile wide area contiguous to the
territorial sea called the exclusive fisheries zone. Violators of the
prohibition against foreign fishing in the exclusive fisheries zone
are subject to the criminal and civil sanctions provided for in the
Bartlett Act.5
1. United States v. F/V Taiyo Maru, No. 28, SOI 600, 395 F. Supp. 413,
414 (D. Me. 1975). See also Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support
of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction 2, United States v. F/V
Taiyo Maru, No. 28, SOI 600, 395 F. Supp. 413 (D. Me. 1975).
2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1081-86 (1970) (repealed, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82 (Supp.
2, 1976)) (effective Mar. 1, 1977).
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1091-94 (1970) (repealed, 16 U.S.C., §§ 1801-82 (Supp.
2, 1976)) (effective Mar. 1, 1977).
4. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1082(a) and (b) provide:
(a) Any person violating the provisions of this chapter shall be
fined not more than $100,000, or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both.
(b) Every vessel employed in any manner in connection with a
violation of this chapter including its tackle, apparel, furniture, appurtenances, cargo, and stores shall be subject to forfeiture and all fish taken or retained in violation of this chapter or the monetary value thereof shall be forfeited. For the
purposes of this chapter, it shall be a rebuttable presumption
that all fish found aboard a vessel seized in connection with
such violation of this chapter were taken or retained in violation of this chapter.
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1091 and § 1092 provide:
1091. There is established a fisheries zone contiguous to the terriApril 1977 Vol. 14 No. 3
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Because the Taiyo Maru appeared to be in violation of these Acts,
a Coast Guard cutter and several aircraft were dispatched to
investigate and document the vessel's position. By the time the
Coast Guard arrived, the Taiyo Maru was underway and proceed8
ing in an easterly direction.
Despite repeated orders by the Coast Guard to heave to, the
Taiyo Maru steamed on. The Coast Guard pursued and finally
apprehended the vessel at a point approximately 67.9 miles from
7
the mainland of the United States. The Taiyo Maru was escorted
to a port in Maine and her crew of thirty-one confined aboard. The
United States filed a civil complaint for condemnation and forfeiture of the vessel and a criminal information against the ship's
master. The actions charged violation of the Bartlett Act and the
8
Contiguous Fisheries Zone Act.
In United States v. F/V Taiyo Maru, the defendant moved to
dismiss both actions on the grounds that the pursuit and seizure
of the Taiyo Maru on the high seas violated treaties in which the
United States had territorially limited its jurisdiction and that
9
The
therefore the court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant.
torial sea of the United States. The United States will exercise
the same exclusive rights in respect to fisheries in the zone
as it has in its territorial sea, subject to the continuation of
traditional fishing by foreign states within this zone as may
be recognized by the United States.
1092. The fisheries zone has as its inner boundary the outer limits
of the territorial sea and as its seaward boundary a line
drawn so that each point on the line is nine nautical miles
from the nearest point in the inner boundary.
6. Fidell, Hot Pursuit from a Fisheries Zone, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 95, 96
See also Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
(1976).
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction 2, United States v. F/V Taiyo
Maru, No. 28, SOI 600, 395 F. Supp. 413 (D. Me. 1975).
7. 395 F. Supp. at 414. See also Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 1, at 2.
8. United States v. F/V Taiyo Maru, No. 28, SOI 600, 395 F. Supp. 413,
415 (D. Me. 1975).
9. 395 F. Supp. 413 (D. Me. 1975), Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 1, at 8. The defendant acknowledged the general rule that the in rem
jurisdiction of the court and the power of the court to prosecute a criminal
defendant are not impaired by the illegality of the method by which the
defendant is brought into the court's jurisdiction. This general rule is commonly referred to as the Ker-Frisbie rule. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436
(1886), and Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). The defendant urged,
however, that under the exception recognized in Cook v. United States, 288
U.S. 102, 121 (1933), the court was barred from asserting jurisdiction over a

defendant asserted that the seizure of the Taiyo Maru violated the
1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas' 0 and the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone," to
which the United States and Japan are signatories. Specifically,
defendant argued that Articles 2, 6, and 23 of the Convention on
the High Seas were violated when the United States commenced hot
pursuit and seized the Taiyo Maru for a violation of domestic
2
fisheries law.'
Together, Articles 2 and 6 provide for freedom of the seas for
all States.' 3 Article 23 carves out an exception which permits hot
pursuit from the territory, territorial sea, or contiguous zone of
foreign vessels which violate coastal State laws.' 4 However, hot
pursuit may be commenced from the State's contiguous zone only
if there has been a violation of the purposes for which the zone
is established.' 5 These purposes are to be discerned by reference
to Article 24 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone which enumerates four such purposes, none of
6
which include fishing.'
The United States maintained that although the exercise of
fisheries jurisdiction in the contiguous zone is not enumerated in
Article 24, international law recognizes the right of the coastal State
to exercise such jurisdiction. It contended further that because hot
pursuit is permitted for violation of the four purposes enumerated
in Article 24, that same right attaches to coastal State enforcement
of fisheries regulations within the contiguous zone.1"
The issue presented by defendant's motion to dismiss was
whether the United States, as a signatory to the Conventions, had
territorially limited its authority to commence hot pursuit from a
defendant seized in violation of a treaty in which the United States had
territorially limited its jurisdiction. See text accompanying note 92 infra.
10. Done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450

U.N.T.S. 82.
11. Done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516
U.N.T.S. 205.

12. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 1, at 7.
13. See note 25 infra for the text of Article 2. Pertinent provisions of
Article 6 are set forth at note 59 infra.
14. See text accompanying note 60 for pertinent provisions of Article 23.
15. Id.
16. Article 24 provides in pertinent part:
1. In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the
coastal State may exercise the control necessary to:
(a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration,
or sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial
sea. ...
17. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 6, at 14.
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contiguous zone and seize a vessel on the high seas for a violation
of domestic fisheries law. In finding that the United States had
not so limited its authority, the court held that the language of
Article 24 does not preclude the United States from establishing
a contiguous zone for purposes other than those enumerated in the
Article.' 8 Therefore, the commencement of hot pursuit for violation of fisheries law from an exclusive fisheries zone was held not
to violate the Geneva Conventions. Thus, the jurisdiction of the
court was not barred. 19
The court's holding that the language of Article 24 is permissive
rather than restrictive legitimates the unilateral assertion of unlimited coastal State jurisdiction in the contiguous zone. That holding constitutes an assault on the freedom of the high seas. The
significance of that assault is magnified by the enactment of the
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976,20 under which
the United States extends its fisheries jurisdiction from the present
21
twelve-mile zone to one which is 200-nautical miles in breadth.
This Comment will demonstrate that the court was incorrect in
its interpretation of the Geneva Conventions. The court's interpretation rested on two sources: the history of the Geneva Conventions and the perception of Congress concerning the compatibility
of the Bartlett and the Contiguous Fisheries Zone Acts with the
Conventions. This Comment will first examine the history of the
treaty provisions in question to demonstrate that the parties to the
Conventions intended Article 24 to be restrictive. The legislative
history of the Bartlett Act and the Contiguous Fisheries Zone Act
will then be examined to determine whether the court's holding
is supported by congressional perception of compatibility between
the Acts and the Conventions. Finally, the scope of the exception
18. The court stated:
The language of Article 24, relating to the purposes for which a
contiguous zone may be established, is permissive, rather than restrictive. It provides that a coastal State may establish a contiguous zone for purposes of enforcing its customs, fiscal, immigration,
or sanitary regulations. Although Article 24 only affirmatively
recognizes the right of a coastal State to create a contiguous zone
for one of the four enumerated purposes, nothing in the Article precludes the establishment of such a zone for other purposes, including the enforcement of domestic fisheries law.
395 F. Supp. at 419.
19. Id. at 420.
20. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82 (Supp. 2, 1976) (effective Mar. 1, 1977).
21. Id. at § 1811.

established in Cook v. United States22 will be explored to determine its applicability to F/V Taiyo Maru.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE TREATY PROVISIONS AUTHORIZING
ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONTIGUOUS ZONE

Background of the 1958 Geneva Conventions
The 1958 Geneva Conference was the culmination of the international community's desire to codify the law of the sea. The Conference resulted in the adoption of four Conventions, two of which
are pertinent to this Comment: the Convention on the High
Seas 23 and The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contigu24

ous Zone.
The historical background of those two Conventions illustrates
the divergence of philosophical views which have shaped the
modern law of the sea. Traditionally, the sea has been divided into
two zones, the high seas and the territorial sea. The concept of
freedom of the high seas has been recognized as a general principle
of international law. 25 In the territorial sea-a band of the sea
22. 288 U.S. 102 (1933). See note 9 supra.
23. Done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82.
24. Done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516
U.N.T.S. 205. The other two conventions are The Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578,
499 U.N.T.S. 311, and The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T.
138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
25. Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas states:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of
the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by these
articles and by the other rules of international law. It comprises,
inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal States:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by general principles of international law, shall be exercised by all States with
reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise
of freedom of the high seas.
Writing on the nature of the sea as the common property of all nations,
Grotius noted in 1608:
But the poet uses "public", in its usual meaning, not of those things
which belong to any one people, but to human society as a whole;
that is to say, things which are called "public" are, according to
the Laws of the law of nations, the common property of all, and
the private property of none.
For the same reasons the sea
The air belongs to this class ....
is common to all, because it is so limitless that it cannot become
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adjacent to the coastal State-the State may exercise plenary jurisdiction subject only to the right of innocent passage of foreign
ships.26 The breadth of the territorial sea was generally recognized to be one league, or three miles. 27 This three-mile limit has
been maintained by the United States since 1793.28 Under the
doctrinal approach 29 to the law of the sea, the right of the coastal
State to exercise its jurisdiction past the water's edge was limited
to the three-mile territorial sea.
In the early 1700's, coastal States asserted limited jurisdiction on
the high seas to prevent infringement within their territory or territorial sea of certain domestic laws and regulations. For example,
under the Hovering Acts,30 England asserted authority to search
all ships approaching the coast or laying at anchor off the coast
a possession of any one, and because it is adapted for the use of
all, whether we consider it from the point of view of navigation
or of fisheries.
H. GRoTrus, MARE LmERVm 281 (1608) (Magoffin trans. 1916).
26. Note, Restriction of Freedom on the High Seas, 8 HARv. INT'L L.J.

156, 157 (1967). See C.
87 (6th ed. 1967).

COLOMBos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA

27. Heinzen, The Three-Mile Limit: Preserving the Freedom of the

Seas, 11 STAN. L.R. 597, 642 (1959). While the three-mile limit was generally recognized at the time of the 1958 Conventions, historically the
breadth of the territorial sea was a matter of much debate. S. SWARZ10-50 (1972).
28. See note from Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson to British Minister
Hammond (Nov. 8, 1793), quoted in 1 J. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST
TRAUBER, THE THREE-IVIILE LIMIT OF THE TERRITORIAL SEAS

702-03 (1906).
29. In this Comment the term doctrinal approach refers to the school
of thought which favors the strict limitation of coastal State sovereignty
to the State's territory or territorial sea. The term is an adaptation of a
description of that school by two noted commentators, McDougal & Burke,
Crisis in the Law of the Sea: Community Perspectives Versus National

Egoism, 67 YALE L.J. 539 (1958). McDougal and Burke state:
[T]hose who seek to protect claims to the more inclusive uses of
the seas may be observed to assert a doctrinaire, absolutistic conception of freedom of the seas and to minimize, if not ignore altogether, the complementary half of the law of the sea which protects
the exclusive interests of coastal states, as well as to deny on occasion even the necessity of accommodating competing inclusive interests.
Id. at 546.
The authors ascribe the doctrinal approach to such authorities as the In-

ternational Law Commission (in reference to the Commission's pre-1958
conception of the high seas and the contiguous zone), Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, and Colombos, writing in The International Law of the Sea. Id.

n.25.

30. 24 Geo. 3, c. 47, § 4 (1784), 9 Geo. 2, c. 35, § 23 (1736).

when customs violations were suspected. In 1790, the United States
established a zone of four leagues breadth in which the unauthorized unloading of cargo by vessels approaching the United States
was prohibited. 31 Notwithstanding the exercise of such reasonable
preventive or protective jurisdiction by coastal States beyond the
territorial sea,32 the essential freedom of the high seas was not
33
disputed.
The international recognition of the coastal States' right to exercise preventive and protective jurisdiction on the high seas was a
precursor of the functional approach 34 to the law of the sea. Under
the functionalist view, a coastal State must have limited jurisdiction beyond its territorial sea to protect against specific violations
of its laws. The scope of that jurisdiction would reflect a reasonable assessment of the State's interest in protecting against those
violations.3 5
By 1930, the right of the coastal State to exercise such jurisdiction was a recognized fact of international law. The original
31. Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, §§ 12-13, 31, & 64, 1 Stat. 157-58, 164-65 &
175 (1845).
32. For a statement of the "reasonableness test" in the context of a
coastal State's right to exercise jurisdiction on the high seas, see Church
v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 234-35 (1804).
33. Note, supra note 26, at 157.
34. In this Comment the term functional approach refers to the school
of thought which favors the definition of a coastal State's exclusive authority on the high seas by reference to a reasonable assessment of coastal
State interests.
These functionalists argue against an absolute limitation of a state's
rights to the territorial sea, exclusive of the high seas; rather it is
argued, various zones of the high seas should be brought within
the jurisdiction of a state for certain limited and mutually distinguishable purposes such as custom, safety, sanitary and fishing
without otherwise impairing the characterization as "high seas" of
the circumscribed waters.
Id. at 159. See also D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES: A
FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY-ORIENTED INQUIRIES 448 (1965).
The scope and extent of coastal State jurisdiction is determined, under
the functional approach, by the consideration of factors which include:
[t]he interest sought to be protected, the significance of that interest, . . . the scope of the authority asserted, the relationship beIn
tween the claimed authority and the interest at stake ....

speaking of contiguous zones comprehensively, it is clear that the
interest at stake may vary enormously, just as the activities carried
out on the ocean may range greatly in purpose and effect. Similarly, the significance of the interest involved may fluctuate from
state to state, and through time for the same state ....
M. MCDOUGAL &W. BuRxE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 579-80 (1962).
35. In the words of McDougal and Burke: "The distance from shore at
which these powers may be exercised is determined not by mileage but
by the necessity of the littoral state and by the connection between the

interests of its territory and the acts performed on the high seas." McDougal &Burke, supra note 29, at 544 n.21. See note 32 supra.
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expression of this contiguous zone concept was made in a proposal
for the 1930 Hague Conference on the Progressive Codification of
International Law. That proposal provided for the exercise, by
the coastal State, of the control necessary to prevent infringement
of its customs, sanitation, and security regulations by foreign
ships. The maximum distance from shore in which that control
36
could be exercised was limited to twelve miles.
The right of coastal States to exercise specific administrative
functions was reaffirmed by the International Law Commission at
its 1950 session.3 7 In 1951, the Rapporteur of the Commission proposed the establishment of a contiguous zone in which the coastal
State could exercise the control necessary to prevent infringement of its customs and sanitation regulations. Again, the maximum distance from shore in which that control could be exercised
was limited to twelve miles. 38 The International Law Commission
accepted that proposal. In addition, it proposed that the contiguous
zone concept include the right of the coastal State to exercise jurisdiction over fiscal matters. Proposals for the inclusion of security
39
and exclusive fishery jurisdiction within the zone were rejected.
In 1953, the International Law Commission proposed that the
jurisdiction of the coastal State in the contiguous zone extend to
40
In
protection against infringement of immigration regulations.
"security"
to
include
1956, the Commission again rejected a proposal
as an enumerated interest over which the coastal State could exercise jurisdiction within the contiguous zone. 41 At the 1958 Con36. Basis of Discussion No. 5, League of Nations Doc. C. 351(b). M. 145
(b), 1930. v., at 179.
37. Summary Records of the International Law Commission, Report on
Regime of the High Seas, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/17SR./65 (1950), reprinted in
[1950] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 204, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SER. A/1950.
38. Regime of the High Seas, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/42 (1951), reprinted in
[1951] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 91, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SER. A/1951/Add. 1.

An English translation appears in 4 M. WHiTEmAN,
LAW 485 (1965).

DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL

39. Report of the International Law Commission covering the work of
its third session, 16 May-27 July 1951, to the General Assembly, 6 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 20, U.N. Doc. A/1858 (1951), reprinted in [1951] 2
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 144, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SER. A/1951/Add. 1.
40. Report of the International Law Commission covering the work of
its fifth session, 1 June-14 Aug. 1953, to the General Assembly, 8 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 19, U.N. Doc. A/2456 (1953), reprinted in [1953] 2
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 219, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SER. A/1953/Add. 1.
41. Report of the International Law Commission covering the work of

ference on the Law of the Sea, the inclusion of fisheries in the
contiguous zone was adopted by the First Committee. 4 2 That proposal was rejected, however, in the plenary session. 43
Thus, throughout the period preceding the 1958 Geneva Conference, two divergent schools of thought were shaping the codification
and progressive development of the law of the sea. 44 The
doctrinal approach emphasized the inclusive uses of the high seas
and the strict limitation of coastal State sovereignty. 45 The funcits eighth session, 23 Apr.-4 July 1956, to the General Assembly, 11 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 39, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 295, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SER. A/1956/Add. 1.
42. II U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, FIRST COMMITTEE 232

(1958).

(The First Committee considered proposals on the territorial sea

and the contiguous zone).
43. II U.N. CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, PLENARY MEETINGS 39
(1958).
44. The historic function of the law of the sea has long been recognized as that of protecting and balancing the common interests, inclusive and exclusive, of all peoples in the use and enjoyment of
the oceans, while rejecting all egocentric assertions of special interests in contravention of general community interest. Historically,
the record is familiar: the oceans of the world, or great segments
thereof, were at one time claimed for the exclusive use of a limited
number of states, but concern for the more general interest of the
whole community of states ultimately succeeded in freeing the
larger expanses of the sea for relatively unhampered use by all.

The knowledge is equally familiar, however, that coastal states
never surrendered their claim to exclusive and comprehensive authority over certain adjacent areas of the sea and that, even after
a consensus developed that states were not to exercise a continuing
and comprehensive authority beyond a relatively narrow belt of
such waters, it was quickly discovered that the occasional exercise
of some exclusive authority beyond the belt had necessarily to be
honored if the common interests of all states in the security of the
social processes upon their land masses were to be given adequate
protection. Through several centuries of interaction, of particular

claim and of general community acceptance or rejection in response
to such claims, a body of principles and a process of decision were
thus developed which restrained the assertion of special interests
and achieved an economic balancing of demand for protection of
both exclusive and inclusive interests, effectively internationalizing
in the common interest a great resource covering two-thirds of the
earth's surface.
M. MCDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PuBLIc ORDER OF THE OCEANS 1-2 (1962)
(citations omitted).
45. See note 29 supra. Colombos notes:
[T]he high sea cannot be under the sovereignty of any State and
... no State has a right to exercise jurisdiction over it. The sea
must remain common to all nations in order to fulfil its main mission of an international highway. It does not follow, however, that
because no jurisdiction is enjoyed by any State on the high seas,
that the community of nations is not entitled to provide, by international agreement, binding rules on the proper use of the sea to
the greatest possible advantage of all States.
C. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 67 (6th ed. 1967). For
a further example of the doctrinal approach, see Fitzmaurice, The Law and
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State to exertional approach emphasized the right of the coastal 46
cise reasonable exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas.
Establishment of a Contiguous Zone Under Article 24

The foregoing history culminated in the adoption of Article 24
of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.
Pertinent provisions of Article 24 provide:
1. In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the
coastal State may exercise the control necessary to:
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration,
or sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial
sea;

Punish infringement of the above regulations committed
within its territory or territorial sea.
2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
the base line
measured. 47
(b)

The extent to which advocates of the doctrinal approach prevailed in influencing the law of the sea is illustrated by the
development of that Article. Although the functionalists emphasized the right of the coastal State to exercise reasonable jurisdiction on the high seas within a contiguous zone, both the breadth
of the zone and the types of jurisdiction which the coastal States
were permitted to exercise reflected distinct doctrinal attitudes.
The trend toward quantifying the rights of the coastal State was
apparent in the 1956 Draft Article 66 of the International Law Commission, 48 the substance of which was adopted as Article 24 of the
Procedureof the International Court of Justice, 1951-1954: Points of Substantive Law, 31 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 371, 378 (1954).
46. See notes 32; 34, & 35 supra.

47. Done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, Art. 24, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No.

5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.

48. Report of the International Law Commission covering the work of
its eighth session, 23 Apr.-4 July 1956, to the General Assembly, 11 U.N.

GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 39, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2
Y.B. INT'L L. COMm'N 294, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SER. A/1956/Add. 1.
The Draft Article provided:
(1) In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the
coastal State may exercise the control necessary to
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, or sanitary
regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed
within its territory or territorial sea.
(2) The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles

Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. The
1956 Draft Article and the 1958 Convention recognized the right
of the coastal State to exercise limited jurisdiction for enumerated
functions. 4 9 In addition, both the Draft Article and Article 24 provided for the exercise of that limited jurisdiction in a zone of a
maximum breadth of twelve miles.
The commentary of Draft Article 66 further emphasizes the
doctrinal approach taken by the International Law Commission
drafters. The Commission noted that international law accords
coastal States the right to exercise limited control in the contiguous
zone. However, it was emphasized that the right to exercise that
control did not alter the underlying legal status of the zone as a
part of the high seas. The commentary stated: "These waters are
and remain a part of the high seas and are not subject to the sovereignty of the coastal State, which can exercise over them only
such rights as are conferred on it by the present draft or are
derived from international treaties." 50
The initial phrase of Article 24, "zone of the high seas contiguous
to its territorial sea," exhibits the emphasis which the drafters of
that Article placed upon the reaffirmance of the essential character of the contiguous zone. The contiguous zone, as it is defined
in Article 24 of the Convention, embodies the international community's desire to guarantee freedom of the high seas while recognizing the peculiar needs of the coastal State in protecting specific
domestic interests. The language of the draft article, Article 24,
the commentary of the International Law Commission, and the
understanding of the parties to the 1958 Convention5 1 clearly indicate the intent of the international community to define the essenfrom the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured.
49. The functions enumerated in Article 24 are customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation regulations. See text accompanying note 47 supra. The
1956 Draft Article enumerated customs, fiscal, and sanitation regulations.
See note 48 suprafor the provisions of the Draft Article.
50. Report of the International Law Commission covering the work of
its eighth session, 23 Apr.-4 July 1956, to the General Assembly, 11 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 39, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2
Y.B. INT'L L. Comvx'N 294, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SER. A/1956/Add. 1.
51. Dean, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What was
Accomplished, 52 AM. J. IN'L L. 607, 624 (1958). Mr. Dean, Chairman
of the United States delegation to the Conference, stated:
Of course, it was understood that the powers to be given to the
coastal state in the area [the contiguous zone] were to be limited
to the protection of the interests cited, and were not to include sovereignty over the zone involved, or alter the character of that zone
as part of the high seas.
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tial character of the contiguous zone as a part of the high seas and
to restrict the authority of the coastal State in the area beyond
the territorial sea.
The enumeration in Article 24 of the purposes for which a
contiguous zone might be established, like the fixing of a definite
geographic extent of the contiguous zone, marked a concession to
advocates of the doctrinal approach. The countervailing desires of
the functionalists had been to define the breadth of the contiguous
zone in terms of reasonableness rather than in terms of a fixed
number of miles and to allow flexibility concerning the purposes for
which the zone could be used. Those desires did not find expression in Article 24. Rather, the Article fixed the maximum breadth
of the zone as twelve miles and specified the particular demands
for which the international community would tolerate the exten52
sion of the coastal State's jurisdiction onto the high seas.
As can be seen from the language of Article 24, the contiguous
zone may be used to protect four specific interests: customs, fiscal,
immigration, and sanitation. These four concerns share common
elements. First, the injury caused by the breach of each is one
which will occur in the territory of the territorial sea of the coastal
State. The interests cognizable under Article 24 are plainly those
which prevent the physical invasion of the coastal State proper.
The flow of the injury is from the contiguous zone to the coastal
State, rather than from the contiguous zone away from the coastal
State.
The four concerns share a second common characteristic. In each
case foreign vessels need not be excluded from the zone or prohibited from the exercise of the freedoms of the high seas set forth
in Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas 53 in order to ac54
commodate the coastal State's interests.
The common properties which underlie the purposes for which
a contiguous zone may be established under Article 24 are not present in an exclusive fisheries zone. In an exclusive fisheries zone,
the objects of protection are shareable high seas resources. In a
52. Fitzmaurice, Some Results of the Geneva Conference on the Law of
the Sea, 8 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 73, 112 (1959).

53. See note 25 supra for the text of Article 2 of the Convention on the
High Seas.

54. Fitzmaurice, supra note 52, at 119.

contiguous zone established for the protection of the coastal State's
customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation interests, the objects of
protection are exclusive to the coastal State and are, therefore, not
shareable. 55
The rights sought to be protected by an exclusive fisheries zone
have little in common with the rights protected under Article 24.
The exclusive fisheries zone excludes foreign vessels from an area
of the high seas and prohibits the exercise of the freedoms guaranteed in Article 2. The flow of the injury caused by a violation
of the exclusive fisheries zone does not necessarily impact the territory or territorial sea of the coastal State. The purpose of an
exclusive fisheries zone is not "closely related to well-accepted
5 0 or its
coastal State governmental interests in its territorial sea"6
territory. Rather, the purpose is to "primarily and directly serve
and protect the private or individual interests of the particular per' 7
sons or corporations engaged in fishing."
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, Article 24 is quite
specific in enumerating the four purposes for which a contiguous
zone may be established. Furthermore, the drafters exercised painstaking care to ensure that the four interests of the coastal State
would be compatible with those of the international community.
The interests included in Article 24 share at least two common characteristics: a connection to the need for protecting the nation's
territory and enforceability without excluding foreign vessels from
the zone. Finally, the restrictive nature of the Article is shown
by the fact that various preliminary proposals, both more and less
restrictive than that finally adopted, had been rejected.5 8 In light
55. D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES: A FRAMEWORK
FOR POLICY-ORIENTED INQUIRIEs 341 (1965).
56. FISHERIES CONFLICTS IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC: PROBLEMS OF MANAGEMENT AND JURISDICTION 151 (G. Potecorvo ed. 1974, Law of the Sea Institute
Workshop, Hamilton, Bermuda).
57. Fitzmaurice, supra note 52, at 120. The counterargument, that
the primary purpose of the fisheries zone is to protect a nationally important interest, should be considered in light of the regionalized protection
which the United States fishery zone affords. Although the zone does protect the interests of the east-coast fishing industry, the west-coast based
tuna industry opposed the establishment of the zone. Hearings on S. 2218
Before the Subcomm. on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 65, at 103 (1966). It has
also been noted that "[o]ne would have to make the conclusion with respect
to fisheries in the United States that it is not a nationally important business, politics and regional factions notwithstanding."
Walsh, Some
Thoughts on National Ocean Policy: The Critical Issue, 13 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 594, 603 (1976).
58. See text accompanying notes 36-43 supra.
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of the unequivocal language, the four clearly delimited purposes,
and the extensive history of Article 24, the court's conclusion that
the Article's terms are permissive rather than restrictive cannot be
supported.
Hot Pursuit from the Contiguous Zone: Articles 2 and 23
Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas provides for the
freedom of the high seas. Article 6 of that Convention provides
for the exclusive jurisdiction of a signatory over vessels on the high
seas which fly that State's flag.5 9 Together, these Articles comprise the general rule that the high seas are free to all nations and
that no State may purport to exercise jurisdiction on those waters
over vessels other than its own.
An exception to that general rule is found in Article 23 of the
Convention on the High Seas. That Article provides in pertinent
part:
The hot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken when the
competent authorities of the coastal State have good reason to
believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations of that
State. Such pursuit must be commenced when the foreign ship or
one of its boats is within the internal waters or territorial sea or
the contiguous zone of the pursuing State. .

.

. If the foreign ship

is within a contiguous zone, as defined in Article 24 of the Conven-

tion on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the pursuit
may only be undertaken if there has been a violation of the rights
for the protection of which the zone was established.O
As the italicized portion indicates, the scope of Article 23 is
defined by reference to Article 24 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone when the foreign ship is within
the contiguous zone. Taken together, the two Articles permit a
coastal State to commence hot pursuit of a foreign vessel within
the contiguous zone only if the competent authorities of the coastal
State have good reason to believe that the ship has engaged in acts
59. Article 6 of the Convention on the High Seas states in pertinent part:
(1) Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save
in exceptional cases expressly provided for in international
treaties or in these articles, shall be subject to its exclusive
jurisdiction on the high seas.
60. Done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, Art. 23, 15 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No.
5200, 45 U.N.T.S. 82 (emphasis added).

which infringe or threaten to infringe, within the territory or territorial sea, the coastal State's customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitation regulations.
The court's finding that the United States did not agree to refrain
from the initiation of hot pursuit in a contiguous fisheries zone is
logically flawed. Even assuming arguendo that the court was
correct in suggesting that nothing in Article 24 "precludes the
establishment of . . . a [contiguous] zone for other purposes,
including the enforcement of domestic fisheries law,"'" it does not
follow that Article 23 permits hot pursuit in response to a violation
of those other purposes. The authority of a signatory to the 1958
Conventions to engage in hot pursuit does not flow from the right
of that nation to establish a zone. Rather, such authority flows
from Article 23, which limits a State's right to commence hot pursuit from its contiguous zone to cases in which an Article 24 purpose
is in need of protection.
The considerations which occasioned the international community's agreement to permit the coastal State to engage in hot pursuit, for purposes of enforcing the interests enumerated in Article
24, are wholly foreign to the purposes for which an exclusive fisheries zone is established. Analysis of the treaty provisions indicates
that the establishment of such a zone did not mitigate the territorial
limitation which the United States imposed upon its own authority
62
when it signed the Convention on the High Seas.
61. 395 F. Supp. at 421 (emphasis added).
62. The court emphasized the fact that the 1958 and 1960 Geneva Conferences did not resolve the issues of the breadth of the territorial sea or the
extent to which a coastal State could exercise exclusive fishing rights.
Id. at 420-21. That fact is not relevant to the question of whether
the United States territorially limited its jurisdiction with regard to engaging in hot pursuit. If the court sought to imply by its emphasis that because no limit to the breadth of the territorial sea was established, the
United States may exercise the same sovereignty in the contiguous zone
which it exercised in its territorial sea, the implication is unfounded. Following the 1960 Geneva Conference the United States specifically reaffirmed its position that the three-mile limit of the territorial sea is the only
limit recognized by international law. The United States has not wavered
from that position. Dean, The Second Geneva Conference on the Law of
the Sea: The Fight for Freedom of the Sea, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 751, 788
(1960). That the United States might have extended its territorial sea to
the twelve-mile limit does not alter the fact that the waters beyond the
three-mile territorial sea, which was retained by the United States, are high
seas. These waters are not subject to the sovereignty of the United States.
O'Connell, International Law and Contemporary Naval Operations,44 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 19, 70-71 (1970).
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CONGRESSIONAL PERCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THE BARTLETT ACT63 AN) THE 6CONTIGUOUS
4
FISHERIES ZONE ACT
In support of its holding that the United States did not territorially limit its authority to engage in hot pursuit under Article 23,
the court in F/V Taiyo Maru noted that Congress was aware of
the 1958 Conventions when it passed the Contiguous Fisheries Zone
Act. The court found that Congress perceived no conflict between
that Act and the obligations of the United States under the Conventions. 65
The court's reliance on the Barlett Act and the Continguous
Fisheries Zone Act to support its interpretation of Articles 23 and
24 is unfounded. The inference that Congress found authority for
the establishment of a contiguous fisheries zone within the "permissive"6 6 language of Article 24 is not supported by the legislative history surrounding the two Acts. Rather, that history reveals
congressional awareness of the restrictions imposed by the Conventions with respect to hot pursuit and congressional perception that
authority for the establishment of the contiguous fisheries zone
arose from the development of international law subsequent to the
1958 Conventions.
The Bartlett Act
Prior to 1964, the only federal law prohibiting fishing by foreign
vessels in the territorial waters of the United States was the Nicholson Act.67 The only sanction available for the violation of that
Act was the escorting of the offending vessel beyond the threemile limit of the territorial sea. In 1964, the Bartlett Act was
passed. The Bartlett Act prohibits foreign vessels from fishing in
68
the territorial sea or the internal waters of the United States.
The taking of continental shelf fisheries resources by those vessels
is also prohibited. 69 Criminal and civil penalties are authorized
63. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1081-90 (1970).

64. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1091-94 (1970).
65. 395 F. Supp. at 421.
66. Id. at 419.

67. 46 U.S.C. § 251 (1970).
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1081 (1970).
69. Id.

for violations of the Act 70 and enforcement measures provided. 1

To assess whether Congress perceived a conflict between the 1958
Convention, on the one hand, and the Bartlett and Contiguous
Fisheries Zone Acts, on the other, the court in F/V Taiyo Maru
should have more fully considered the legislative background of
the Bartlett Act. Such consideration is particularly crucial because
the issue before the court, hot pursuit, is an enforcement measure.
The legislative history reveals congressional awareness of the
enforcement questions posed by the passage of the Bartlett Act.
For example, the provision of the Act which prohibits foreign
vessels from taking continental shelf fisheries resources appears to
have raised numerous questions concerning enforcement. The continental shelf may extend beyond the territorial sea onto the high
seas. 72 Under the provisions of the Bartlett Act, the United States
exercises jurisdiction over foreign fishing vessels which, though
they are on the high seas, are engaged in the taking of continental
shelf fisheries resources. The concern about enforcement was
expressed by Admiral Roland, Commander of the United States
Coast Guard. In hearings on the Bartlett Act, Admiral Roland
noted that Coast Guard action against foreign vessels on the high
seas could be undertaken only at the express direction of Congress.
He suggested that if Congress intended for the Coast Guard to enforce the continental shelf provisions of the bill against foreign vessels on the high seas, explicit language to that effect should be included in the bill. 7 3 Similar concern was expressed before the

House of Representatives by the Department of the Interior,7 4 the
76
Attorney General, 75 and the Department of the Treasury.
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1082 (a) & (b) (1970). For an analysis of the sanctions
authorized under the Bartlett Act, see Fidell, Ten Years After the Bartlett
Act: A Prohibitionof ForeignFishing, 54 B. L. Rzv. 703 (1974).
71. 16 U.S.C. § 1083 (1970).
72. Article 1 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf provides:
[T]he term "continental shelf" is used as referring
(a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent
to the coast but outside the territorial sea, to a depth of 200
metres or, beyond where the depth of the superjacent waters
admits of the exploitation of natural resources of the said
areas ...
73. Hearings on S. 1988 Before the Subcomm. on the Merchant Marine
and Fisheries of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 31, at 60 (1963).
74. Hearings on S. 1988 Before the Subcomm. on the Merchant Marine
and Fisheries of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 17, at 12 (1964).
75. Id. at 18.
76. Id. at 20.

[VOL. 14: 656, 1977]

Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Senator Bartlett, possibly in anticipation of the questions concerning the enforcement of the continental shelf provisions of his
bill, inserted into the record of the Senate hearings a report concerning the protection of continental shelf resources under international law. 7 The report analyzed the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf and noted particularly its provisions granting the
coastal State sovereign rights to explore and exploit the resources
of its continental shelf. After finding that the coastal State had
the right to protect its exclusive rights to exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf subjacent to the high seas, the report
concluded:
Sovereign rights of a coastal state to the exclusive exploitation of
the natural resources of the continental shelf would be jus nudum
without adequate protection. However, hot pursuit and seizure of
vessels on the high seas are exceptional measures. They are only
used in certain cases.. . . The limitation of hot pursuit is the logical corollary of the principle that no state on the high seas has
exclusive rights and that, therefore, no state can enact laws concerning them. However, exclusive sovereign rights to the exploitation of natural resources on the Continental Shelf constitute an
exception from the rule governing the high seas. This exception

is established only for specific purposes strictly determined in the
Convention on the Continental Shelf. The validity of any extension of protective measures beyond the limits set forth therein
may
be questioned from the viewpoint of international law.78
Hearings on the bill which ultimately established the enforcement provisions of the Bartlett Act and the Contiguous Fisheries
Zone Act are, therefore, revealing. Congress was informed by
Senator Bartlett, cosponsor of both Acts, of the relationship borne
by Articles 23 and 24 to the enforcement of domestic law on the
high seas. The report submitted by Senator Bartlett concluded that
although the United States has the right to take measures on the
high seas to protect continental shelf resources, the extension of
those measures by means of hot pursuit is questionable under international law.
The Contiguous FisheriesZone Act
The Contiguous Fisheries Zone Act was passed in 1966. It
provides that, in a nine-mile zone adjacent to the territorial sea,
77. Hearings on S. 1988 Before the Subcomm. on the Merchant Marine
and Fisheries of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 31, at 8 (1963).
78. Id. at 10-11 (emphasis added).

the United States will exercise the same exclusive fisheries rights
which it exercises in its territorial sea. 79 Congress' purpose was
to establish for the United States a twelve-mile exclusive fisheries
zone contiguous to its shores.80 The testimony before the congressional committees reveals that Congress, unlike the court in F/V
Taiyo Maru, found justification for the extension of fisheries rights
in international law developed after the 1958 Conventions, not in
the language of those Conventions.
Letters from members of the executive branch of the government
to the chairman of the Commerce Committee of the Senate
emphasized that the Contiguous Fisheries Zone Act was not contrary to international law in view of then recent developments in
international practice. The State Department noted that the trend
since 1960 had been toward the establishment of a twelve-mile fisheries rule in international practice. The contemporary developments in international practice led the Department to conclude that
the extension of fisheries jurisdiction by the Contiguous Fisheries
Zone Act was not contrary to international law."' The legal advisor
for the Department of State sifpported the position that the justification for the Act was based on the development of international
82
law since the Convention.
The congressional sponsors of the bill subsequently enacted as
the Contiguous Fisheries Zone Act also emphasized that the extension of exclusive fishing rights was grounded on the development
of international practice. Senator Kennedy, a cosponsor of the bill,
noted that by 1966 only ten countries, including the United States,
had not extended their fisheries jurisdiction beyond three miles.83
Senator Bartlett, the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on
the Merchant Marine and a long time proponent of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction, went to some length to emphasize the grounding
of the Act in recent international precedent. The Senator stated
that practically all principal maritime nations had unilaterally
extended their fisheries jurisdiction beyond their territorial sea.
He emphasized that the United States would not establish a precedent by extending its jurisdiction to twelve miles from the coast
79. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1091-92 (1970). See note 5 supra.
80. H.R. REP. No. 2086, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (Merchant Marine
and Fisheries Comm.).
81. Hearings on S. 2218 Before the Subcomm. on the Merchant Marine
and Fisheries of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 65, at 2 (1966).
82. Id. at 20.
83. Id. at 7.
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because that precedent had already been established by other
84
nations.
Hearings before the House of Representatives concerning the
extension of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction also focused attention
on the non-precedent-setting nature of the proposal. A State
Department witness noted that as of June 1, 1966, more than sixty
percent of the coastal States had a twelve-mile exclusive fishery
zone. 5
The congressional perception that the Acts were compatible with
international law as it developed after the 1958 Convention is
shared by the International Court of Justice. In 1974 the court
found that since the 1960 Geneva Conference the concept of exclusive coastal State jurisdiction in a twelve-mile wide fisheries zone
86
had crystallized as customary international law.
It is apparent that Congress correctly viewed the exclusive fisheries zone as a concept distinct from the contiguous zone defined in
Article 24. The justification for the zone was based on the practice
of the international community subsequent to the 1958 Conventions.
Between the close of the 1960 Geneva Conference and the passage
of the 1966 Contiguous Fisheries Zone Act, "the 12-mile fisheries
zone had become not only the trend in international practice; it
had become the rule."87 That Congress perceived the Act to be
compatible with the Conventions on the basis of the development
of international law is further evidenced by the absence of reference
to the Article 24 contiguous zone in the hearings before the Senate
subcommittee. There was no attempt by the members of the committee or its witnesses to manipulate the language of Article 24
84. Id. at 8-9.
85. H.R. REP. No. 2086, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1966)

(Merchant Marine

and Fisheries Comm.).
86. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland v. Iceland, [1974] I.C.J. 3, 23.
87. Comment, At Sea With the 89th Congress: The U.S. Fisheries Zone,
18 HASTINGS L.J. 937, 950 (1967). For a synoptical table showing that the
vast majority of coastal States claimed fisheries jurisdiction in excess of

three miles, see H.R. REP. No. 2086, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1966) (Merchant Marine and Fisheries Comm.). According to the State Department,

of the approximately 60 coastal States which claimed 12-mile fisheries jurisdiction in 1966, 39 had asserted that claim after the 1958 Conference. Hearings on H.R. 9530 Before the House Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries,89th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 24, at 281 (1966).

in order to demonstrate compatibility. In fact, the only reference
to such a possibility was asserted in the negative by a subcommittee
witness.8 8
The foregoing legislative history does not show a congressional
intent to prohibit hot pursuit under either the Bartlett Act or the
Contiguous Fisheries Zone Act. Congress did consider, however,
the conflict between Article 24 and hot pursuit from a point on
the high seas for purposes other than those enumerated in Article
24. Thus, the court's reliance on the notion that "Congress perceived no conflict between the Act and the treaty provisions"89 to
support its decision is clearly unfounded.
THE Cook DOCTRINE

Under the Ker-Frisbie rule,90 "the power of the government to
enforce a forfeiture or to prosecute a defendant is not impaired
by the illegality of the method by which it has acquired control
over the property or the defendant." 91 The defendant's motion to
dismiss in F/V Taiyo Maru was grounded on an exception to the
Ker-Frisbie rule.

In Cook v. United States,92 the British ship

Mazel Toy had been seized for violating the Prohibition Act.9 3 The
Tariff Act of 1930 authorized the seizure by the Coast Guard of
94
foreign vessels within twelve miles of the United States' coast.
In Cook the defendants argued that the courts of the United States
lacked jurisdiction over the defendants because the seizure had been
in contravention of a treaty9 5 between the United States and Great
Britain. That treaty provided that the United States would stop
British vessels for suspected violation of the Prohibition Act when
the vessels were within one hour's sailing distance from the coast
of the United States. Although the Mazel Toy had been seized
beyond the one hour limitation,9" the United States contended that
88. Hearings on S. 2218 Before the Subcomm. on the Merchant Marine
and Fisheries of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 65, at 116 (1966).
89. 395 F. Supp. at 421.
90. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519
(1953). For an extensive examination of the Ker-Frisbie rule, its authority,
exceptions, and current validity, see Comment, United States v. Toscanino:
An Assault on the Ker-Frisbie Rule, 12 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 865 (1975).
91. 395 F. Supp. at 418.
92. 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
93. Id. at 107.
94. Tariff Act of 1930, § 581, 46 Stat. 590, 747 (1970).
95. Convention for the Protection of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors
with Great Britain, Jan. 23, 1923, 43 Stat. 1761, T.S. No. 685 (proclaimed
May 22, 1924).

96. 288 U.S. at 107-08.
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the alleged illegality of the seizure was immaterial. The government argued that because the vessel had been brought into a port
of the United States and the United States had ratified the seizure
by bringing an action for forfeiture, the federal district court had
97
acquired jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court, however, held that the general rule asserted
by the United States did not control the case at bar. In holding
for the defendant, the Court defined an exception to the doctrine
embodied by the Ker-Frisbie rule. The Court stated that the
doctrine asserted by the government was applicable when the
United States ratified a seizure made by one without authority.
The Court noted that the unauthorized seizure of the Mazel Toy
could not be ratified because the United States itself lacked the
power to seize the vessel. The United States was found to have
imposed, by treaty, a territorial limitation upon its own authority.9 8 The Court held that the government, "lacking power to seize,
lacked power, because of the Treaty, to subject the vessel to our
laws. To hold that adjudication may follow a wrongful seizure
would go far to nullify the purpose and effect of the Treaty."99
The defendant in F/V Taiyo Maru urged that the jurisdiction of
the United States was similarly limited under the 1958 Geneva Conventions. As discussed earlier, 100 the United States had agreed
in Articles 2 and 23 of the Convention on the High Seas not to
initiate hot pursuit commencing from its contiguous zone except
for a violation of one of the purposes set forth in Article 24.
Because the hot pursuit was not commenced in accordance with
the Articles, the defendant maintained that the courts of the United
States were barred by Cook from asserting jurisdiction. 10
The court denied defendant's motion, finding the Cook exception
inapplicable because the "Conventions in the case at bar contain
no specific undertaking by the United States not to conduct hot
pursuit from a contiguous fisheries zone extending 12 miles from
97. Id. at 120-21.
98. Id. at 121-22.

99. Id. at 122.
100. See text accompanying notes 59-62 supra for discussion of the limitations on hot pursuit under Articles 2 and 23 of the Convention on the High
Seas.
101. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, supra note
1, at 8.

its coast. 10°2 The absence of a specific undertaking not to engage
in a particular act appears to have been given controlling weight
by the court. Such weight is questionable, for a similar argument
made by the government in Cook had been rejected by the
Supreme Court.
The treaty between the United States and Great Britain, applicable in Cook, provided that "the rights conferred by this article
shall not be exercised at a greater distance from the coast ...

than

can be traversed in one hour by the vessel suspected."'103 The government unsuccessfully contended that the treaty governed only
seizures made within the one-hour limitation. Because the vessel
was seized beyond one-hour's distance, the government argued that
10 4
the treaty was inapplicable.
Despite rejection by the Supreme Court in Cook of that argument, the court in F/V Taiyo Maru placed further reliance on
Autry v. Wiley.' °5 The First 'Circuit Court of Appeals in Autry
stated that the Cook doctrine is a "narrow" exception to the general
rule and is applicable only to violation of a specific territorial
circumspection set by treaty.1 6 Autry is distinguishable. In that
case, petitioner, a deserter from the United States Navy, challenged
the jurisdiction of the court on the theory that his return to the
United States by the Canadian government violated the NATO
Status of Forces agreement. 0 7 The petitioner argued that the
Status of Forces agreement limited United States military jurisdiction in Canada to members of the military on official duty in that
country. At the time of his arrest, petitioner, as a deserter, was
not on official military duty in Canada. Therefore, he asserted that
his return by the Canadian government to the United States at
the request of the United States was in violation of the Status of
Forces agreement. The petitioner cited Cook for the proposition
that "obtaining custody in violation of a treaty defeats United
States jurisdiction."' 0 8 In rejecting that argument, the court held
that the petitioner's claim was not that the treaty had been
violated, but rather that he was beyond the scope of the treaty. 10 9
102. 395 F. Supp. at 420.
103. 288 U.S. at 111.
104. Id. at 112.
105. 440 F.2d 799 (lst Cir. 1971).
106. Id. at 802.
107. Id. at 800.
108. Id. The petitioner also contended that United States v. Rauscher,
119 U.S. 407 (1886), barred the court's jurisdiction. In Rauscher, the prosecution of an extradicted fugitive for an offense other than the one for which
he had been extradicted barred jurisdiction of the court. The court in Autry found Rauscherinapplicable to the case at bar. 440 F.2d at 801.
109. 440 F.2d at 802.
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In F/V Taiyo Maru the defendant did not allege that the ship
and its master were beyond the scope of the treaty. Indeed, such
an allegation could not possibly have been made because Article
2 of the Convention on the High Seas specifically declares that "the
high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport
to subject any part of them to its sovereignty." Thus, the Autry
requirement for specificity appears to have been satisfied. The
undertaking by the United States to impose a territorial limitation
upon its own authority was no less "specific" in F/V Taiyo Maru
than in Cook.
CONCLUSION

The history of the 1958 Geneva Conventions reveals that Article
24 was an extensively negotiated provision which embodies the resolution of the conflict between the interests of the coastal State and
those of the international community. The restrictive character of
that Article is beyond dispute. The F/V Taiyo Maru's holding to
the contrary ignored, and to a large extent disrupted, the careful
balancing of rights which the Article sought to codify.
The perception by Congress of the compatibility between the
Bartlett Act and the Contiguous Fisheries Zone Act, rather than
supporting the court's holding, highlights a fundamental flaw in
the court's reasoning. Congress found justification for the establishment of the exclusive fisheries zone in the development of international law after the 1958 Conventions. Congress viewed the
exclusive fisheries zone as a concept wholly separate from the
Article 24 contiguous zone. Unlike the court, Congress did not conclude that a coastal State may, on the basis of Article 24, unilaterally establish a contiguous zone for any purpose. Rather, Congress
emphasized that the right to establish the zone and the authority
to exercise enforcement measures therein arose out of the recognition and assent of the international community. The 1974 holding
of the International Court of Justice' 10 vindicates the approach
taken by Congress and seriously undermines that of the court in
F/V Taiyo Maru.
Clearly, the right of a coastal State to establish an exclusive fisheries zone is recognized by international law. The right of the
110. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland v. Iceland, [1974] I.C.J. 3, 23. See text accompanying
note 86 supra.

coastal State to engage in hot pursuit from the zone has not been
accorded the same recognition. To extend that right on the basis
of international practice, a greater showing of that practice is
required than the mere assertion by the United States that it is
unaware of any nation which disclaims the right to commence hot
pursuit to enforce its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction.1 1
The United States did, in fact, territorially limit its authority to
engage in hot pursuit by its participation in the 1958 Conventions.
These Conventions imposed a limitation which was at least as clear
and specific as the limitation found by the Supreme Court in Cook
to have destroyed the Court's jurisdiction. The court in F/V Taiyo
Maru erred in denying the applicability of Cook. In its error, the
court committed an unwarranted assault on the freedom of the sea.

ERIC ALLAN SISCO

111. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 14. It has been noted that the few
instances in which hot pursuit has been commenced from a fisheries zone
and the recognition by commentators such as Professors Knight and Poulantzas of the right of a coastal State to commence hot pursuit in such instances do not establish a rule of customary international law. Ciobanu,
Hot Pursuitfrom a FisheriesZone: A Further Comment on United States
v. Fishing Vessel Taiyo Maru No. 28, United States v. Kawaguchi, 70 AM.
J.INT'L L. 549, 552 (1976). See Casenote, The Right of Hot Pursuit from
Exclusive Fishery Zones: United States v. "F/V Taiyo Maru, No. 28," 15
COLUm. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 336 (1976).

